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Abstract
This article presents a model of sequential decisions about investments in en-
vironmentally dirty and clean technologies, which extends the path-dependence
framework of Arthur (1989). This allows us to evaluate if and how an economy
locked into a dirty technology can be unlocked and move towards the clean tech-
nology. The main extension involves the inclusion of the effect of recombinant
innovation of the two technologies. A mechanism of endogenous competition is de-
scribed involving a positive externality of increasing returns to investment which are
counterbalanced by recombinant innovation. We determine conditions under which
lock-in can be avoided or escaped. A second extension is “symmetry breaking” of
the the system due to the introduction of an environmental policy that charges a
price for polluting. A final extension adds a cost of environmental policy in the
form of lower returns on investment implemented through a growth-depressing fac-
tor. We compare cumulative pollution under different scenarios, so that we can
evaluate the combination of environmental regulation and recombinant innovation.
JEL classification: O33, Q55.
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1 Introduction
Various studies have modeled competition between two or more distinct technologies to
study adoption or investment in R&D (Dosi, 1982; Arthur, 1989; David and Foray, 1994).
Here we extend this literature in two ways to address environmental problems. First, we
add the pollution intensities of competing technologies and introduce an environmental
policy that taxes pollution. Second, we allow for diversified technological choices that
stimulate the emergence of hybrid technological solutions. Our motivation is that in
many, if not most, cases a new technology is the result of recombining two or more existing
technologies in a modular way. The expectation of fruitful recombinant innovations may
therefore drive decisions about R&D investment in the existing technologies (van den
Bergh, 2008). We propose recombinant innovation as a force that counterbalances the
positive externality of technological adoption.
Modularity of technologies and their complementarity are likely to be crucial ingredi-
ents of successful recombination. This may involve the application of a new technology
to a core technology, or be the result of spillovers between different industries. Com-
plementary technologies are usually recombining in a modular way, as is the case in
microelectronics, where different units are combined to form a new electronic instrument.
Many examples of recombinant innovation are found in the area of environmental tech-
nologies. The hybrid car combines a conventional internal combustion engine with an
electric propulsion system. In a Combined Cycle Power Plant a gas turbine generates
electricity while waste heat is used to make steam to generate additional electricity via a
steam turbine. Even more striking is the integrated photovoltaic and gas-turbine system,
where wasted heat is collected by photovoltaic devices (Jaber et al., 2003). A further
example are power plants and vehicles based on fuel cells: different types exist, which
are based on alternative electrolytes (alkaline solutions, polymer membranes, etc.); these
allow for spillovers and recombination. Another case is photovoltaic films, which com-
bine solar cells and thin layers technologies. In general recombinant innovation creates
links between industries that were previously far from each other. One example are the
construction and solar technology industries, with the so-called Building-Integrated Pho-
tovoltaics: photovoltaic materials are used to replace conventional building materials in
parts of the building envelope such as the roof, skylights or facades.
We may conceptually widen the pool of competing recombinant options considering
that two technologies must not necessarily be substitutes to compete. Even if two tech-
nologies show some degree of complementarity, capital and labour constraints mean a
choice is needed between developing the one or the other. Consequently the two tech-
nologies becomes substitutes in the investment decision of this firm. This is the case of
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large corporations that are active in more than one industry. For example, Sanyo and
Sharp, which are traditionally active in consumer electronics, are now also developing
and selling renewable energy technologies, especially photovoltaic devices.
We propose a model of competing technologies that produces different scenarios of
technological evolution and related pollution levels. A “dirty” and a “clean” technology
compete in the market. Recombination of these technologies is possible, giving rise to a
technology with favourable environmental (clean) and economic (viable) characteristics.
This model allows to address the issue of unlocking the economy from the undesirable
dirty technology. More generally, the need for more efficient systems of energy production
and consumption often calls for combining technologies that before were competing or
unrelated. Relevant research questions are then if and how pollution dynamics is affected
by the increasing returns of technological adoption and by the expectation of recombi-
nant innovation, and how a government should intervene to guide the development of
environmentally clean technologies. This is where our model finds its main motivation.
The optimal diversification of research portfolios has been studied by Dasgupta and
Maskin (1987) and, more recently, van den Bergh (2008) and Zeppini-Rossi and van den
Bergh (2008). The latter two analyse the optimal investment in two technologies when
recombinant innovation is taken into account, assuming the probability of recombination
to be larger the more diversified is the technological portfolio. One general finding is
that in an uncertain environment parallelism of investments should not be considered as
waste, unless increasing returns outweigh the benefits from diversification. An investment
in recombinant innovation represents an activity of exploratory research, which typically
involves uncertainty about whether a successful recombination will appear or not.
Our model sets the recombinant innovation problem in a sequential investment deci-
sion framework similar to Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). This allows
us to address path dependence and lock-in of technology investments. The basic idea
is that at each time t one firm sets its share of capital invested in the two competing
technologies. This firm thus decides whether to specialize or to diversify its technological
portfolio, taking into account increasing returns on investment and the probability of
recombinant innovation. Both depends on history, i.e. on previous decisions by other
firms. The event of lock-in is caused by the self-reinforcing mechanism of increasing re-
turns. This mechanism is counterbalanced by recombinant innovation, which can possibly
trigger unlocking.
With our model we study the distribution of outcomes in terms of technology diffusion
and pollution levels. We distinguish between scenarios in which lock-in can be avoided or
not. By introducing a critical mass effect into the probability of recombinant innovation
we also show situations in which a convergence path leading to the dominance of one
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technology may be reverted, so that lock-in may be escaped. We further analyse the
combined effect of an environmental policy and a hybrid technology solution, represented
by recombinant innovation. We find that the latter limits the pollution abatement if the
environmental policy is strong. But if policy stringency can not be high, recombinant
innovation represents a good compromise. This basic picture does not change when we
also consider policy costs.
Resuming, the environmental dimension of our work include four aspects: different
pollution intensities of two competing technologies; increasing returns to scale possibly
leading to lock-in of the dirty technology, which can be countered by recombinant in-
novation resulting in a hybrid technology; environmental policy that affects selection of
technologies; the effects of a cost of such policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and studies the model without
environmental policy. Section 3 extends the analysis with environmental policy with and
without costs. Throughout we employ numerical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Competing clean and dirty technologies
Arthur (1989) proposed a famous model of competing technologies to explain techno-
logical path-dependence and lock-in. Here we extend his model in two ways. First, we
introduce pollution emission of competing technologies. Second, while there is no in-
novation in Arthur’s model, we allow for recombinant innovation of the two competing
technologies. The recombinant innovation never reaches the state where it enters the
competition between technologies. What we study here is how the expectation of its
occurrence affects agents’ decisions and, in turn, technological dynamics.
Assume a large pool of firms that are called, each one at a different time, to make a
decision about the allocation of capital to two available technologies. These happen to
have very different pollution emissions: technology c is relatively clean, while technology d
is relatively dirty. All firms are equal, and do not have heterogeneous intrinsic preferences
for one or the other technology. Time is discrete: in every period t one firm makes an
investment decision for the two available technologies. This is expressed by a share αt,
representing the proportion of investment devoted to technology d. The rest goes to
technology c. Investment by each firm is normalized to 1. Specialization means either
αt = 0 or αt = 1, while perfect diversification is denoted by αt = 1/2.
Let nd,t and nc,t be the values at time t of cumulative capital invested in technology
d and in technology c, respectively. For instance, if at time t a firm chooses to focus
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on investing in technology d, nd,t increases by a unit, while nc,t stays unchanged. The
general formulation of cumulative investments is as follows:
nd,t = nd,t−1 + αt (1)
nc,t = nc,t−1 + 1− αt
The initial condition is w = nd,0+nc,0. Then cumulative investments are nd,t+nc,t = w+t.
This number grows linearly, while pollutive emissions at time t depend on the diffusion of
the two technologies. If ec and ed denote the pollution intensities of c and d, respectively,
with ed > ec, then the total pollution generated at time t is zt = ednd,t + ecnc,t. We look
at two indicators of pollution. The first is the cumulative emissions in [0, t]:
It ≡
t∑
j=1
zj (2)
The second is the average pollution intensity:
zˆt ≡
zt
nd,t + nc,t
= (1− xt)ed + xtec. (3)
Here xt = nc,t/(nd,t + nc,t) is the proportion of technology c. The proportion of the dirty
technology is 1−xt then. This is a state variable of our system: from xt we can compute zˆt,
zt and It. Because of path dependency, two paths of technological investments presenting
different values of zˆt also have different values of It (i.e. paths never cross).
2.2 Recombinant innovation
The dynamics of αt is driven by the sequential decisions of firms. Firms are boundedly
rational and set αt taking into account the value of technological shares in the previous
period. We consider two forces that determine the decision of firm: the first is the positive
network externality of other firms’ decision, as in Arthur’s model. The second is the
expectation that the two technology may recombine in an innovative hybrid technology.
Recombinant innovation occurs with probability pt, which is larger the more diversified is
the cumulative investment. We formalize this probability as the balance of the cumulative
investment in the two technologies (Zeppini-Rossi and van den Bergh, 2008):
pt = 4η(t)
nd,tnb,t
(nc,t + nb,t)2
= 4η(t)xt(1− xt) (4)
Here η(t) ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the effectiveness of the recombination process, which
captures how easily the two technologies recombine.1 It is affected by general techno-
logical technological progress, resulting in a learning curve of recombinant technology.
1The factor 4 normalizes the maximum value of this balance function to 1, which is attained when
the two technologies are equally represented (nd,t = nc,t).
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We assume this is increasing with a critical mass effect, which relates to the S-shaped
path of technological growth (Mansfield, 1961). To reflect this phenomena, we define the
effectiveness η as follows:
η(t) =
e
1 + exp(−v(t− t0))
(5)
The critical mass is represented by the flex point t0. The parameter v controls the
speed of technological advance. The critical mass t0 separates two different regimes:
below t0 marginal effects are increasing, while above t0 they are diminishing. This is a
typical feature of technological innovation, where a new idea or technique needs to acquire
a minimal amount of investment or recognition before taking off. After this critical
mass is reached, further improvements only add diminishing benefits to the innovation.
The independent variable t has a double interpretation: it represents time as well as
investment, since in each period one unit of capital is invested. Finally, the parameter
e ∈ [0, 1] is a static value of recombination effectiveness, which may be seen as an indicator
of how distant the two recombinant technologies are in the technological space.
The decision problem is twofold: a firm must decide whether to specialize or to
diversify; and, in case specialization is preferred, which technology to choose (a or b).
When facing the investment decision the firm has to balance two forces, namely the
probability pt and the returns to adoption for each technology. The first means a force
towards maximal diversity or α = 1/2, and the second towards specialization. In other
words, firms decide based on the following rule of thumb: if the probability of recombinant
innovation is large, it is better to diversify the investment. If it is low, it is better to
go for specialization. The part of the investment that is not equally allocated goes to
technology a with probability q. All this is expressed by the following rule:
αt =
1
2
pt−1 + γt(1− pt−1) γt ∼ binomial(0, 1; q) (6)
The random variable βt makes xt a stochastic process. If we “freeze” β, we have a
deterministic one-dimensional system: knowing xt is enough to compute pt, αt+1 and
xt+1. Without recombination (e = 0), αt is either 0 or 1, and we have Arthur’s model.
2.3 Network externalities
A self-reinforcing mechanism of increasing returns to investment describes the effect of
network externalities in technological decisions. Assume the probability q of the binomial
variable γt (equation 6) is a function of the proportion of technological investments xt,
and, in turn, of past realizations of αt itself. Increasing returns to investments means
that q is increasing in xt. Formally we set qt = f(xt) with f(x) increasing. f is called
the allocation function. A straightforward specification is f(x) = x: whenever the dirty
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technology is more diffused, xt < 1/2, we have qt < 1/2, which makes investment in the
clean technology less likely than in the dirty technology. A discrete choice process where
the probability of one option is equal to the actual proportion of that option is called a
Polya process. Arthur’s (1989) model relies on a generalization of such processes, called
generalized Polya processes, which were studied in more detail in Arthur et al. (1987).
We will refer to this model as AEK henceforth.
When we set f(x) = x, the process always converges to a limit value, which is not
known a priori. Such a model is not suitable for technology dynamics, as it does not
capture the stylized fact of lock-in of a technology: the share xt needs to converge to
an equilibrium where one technology is dominant. This is achieved using an S-shaped
increasing allocation function, with three fixed points x1 < x2 < x3 such that x2 is
unstable while x1 and x3 are stable. For two equally good technologies without external
intervention (environmental policy), x2 = 1/2, while x1 and x2 satisfy the symmetry
condition f(x1) = 1− f(x2).
2.4 Arthur’s model extended
The AEK model of Arthur et al. (1987) and Arthur (1989) can be extended with recom-
binant innovation. We show that the resulting model coincides with our model in the
sense of having the same distribution of realizations of the state variable. In the AEK
model the equation of motion for the proportion x is the following:
xt+1 = xt +
1
w + t
[
α(xt)− xt
]
(7)
where w is the initial number of investments and β is a random variable defined as:
α(x) =


1 with probability q(x)
0 with probability 1− q(x)
(8)
This binomial random variable accounts for the increments of technologies’ choices based
on a probability given by the allocation function q(x). The latter controls the type of
feedback produced by the proportion x. As before, we are interested in positive feedback,
which means an increasing function q. We adopt a binomial logit specification, which is
a customary assumption of discrete choice models (Hommes, 2006)2:
q(x) ≡
exp(βx)
exp(βx) + exp(β(1− x))
=
1
1 + exp[β(1− 2x)]
(9)
2We also studied results for the sinusoidal allocation function q(x) = 1/2
{
1 + sin
[
pi(x − 1/2)
]}
, but
prefer the logistic one as it is more flexible in describing different conditions in terms of convergence of
the decision process and possible asymmetries of available options.
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This specification contains the implicit utility function u(xt) = xt. The intensity of choice
β > 0 reflects the rationality of firms in making a decision3. Extreme cases are β = 0
(each technology is selected with equal probability, for any value of x) and β = ∞ (one
technology is selected with probability one, as soon as x > 1/2). The left part of figure 1
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Figure 1: Left: examples of allocation function. Right: Seven simulations of the AEK model with β = 8.
reports some examples of q(x): the larger is β, the more the allocation function resembles
a step function, with stable fixed points approximated by 0 and 1. The right part of figure
1 shows seven simulations of xt for β = 8. Lock-in always occurs, with equal probability
for each technology.
The AEK model can be extended to include recombinant innovation, introducing the
expectation that available technologies recombine with a positive probability. To do this
we redefine the decision variable (8) with
α(x; t) =


1 with probability [1− p(x; t)]q(x)
1/2 with probability p(x; t)
0 with probability [1− p(x; t)][1− q(x)]
(10)
With probability 1−p(x; t) we still apply the Polya process mechanism equipped with an
allocation function q(x), and with probability p(x; t) we diversify and update technological
proportions with the balanced investment allocation expressed by α = 1/2.
Now we show that our model and the extended AEK model converge to the same
distribution. Substitute equation (4) in (6) and the result in (1):
na,t+1 = na,t + 2e
na,tnb,t
(na,t + nb,t)2
+ βt+1
[
1− 4e
na,tnb,t
(na,t + nb,t)2
]
(11)
3Alternatively, if one thinks that firms decide based on some information about their environment, β
is the inverse of the variance of the noise that affects such information.
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This equation can be written in terms of the proportion of investments xt =
nb,t
(na,t+nb,t
,
xt+1 = xt
w + t
w + t+ 1
+
1
w + t+ 1
[
2ext(1− xt)(1− 2βt+1) + βt+1
]
(12)
= xt
w + t
w + t+ 1
+
1
w + t+ 1
[αt+1] = xt +
1
w + t+ 1
(αt+1 − xt)
This resembles Arthur’s process (7). The main difference lies in the decision variable αt,
which is (6) in our model, and (10) in the extended AEK. We show how the distributions
of the two models coincide in the long run. The expected value of (12) is:
Et[xt+1] = xt +
1
w + t+ 1
[1
2
pt + q(xt)(1− pt)− xt
]
The expected value of (7), with α given by (10), is:
Et[xt+1] = xt +
1
w + t
[1
2
pt + q(xt)(1− pt)− xt
]
The two expected values coincide as soon as time t >> 1. Then we can say the two
model converge to the same distribution. For this reason, we will use the extended AEK
model henceforth, and refer to it as to the model of competing recombinant technologies.
2.5 Simulation of the model
In order to apply our model to the environmental problem we set an unbalanced initial
condition, with the dirty technology d being more diffused than the clean technology c.
By simulating the model, we study the different scenarios produced by different values
of the parameters. In this section we focus on the role of recombinant innovation, asking
whether this effect can reduce emissions without any environmental policy.
In what follows we set the following conditions: emission intensities ed = 10, ec = 1.
Initial shares x0 = 0.1, initial number of cumulative investment w = 100. The allocation
function (9) has β = 8. The effectiveness of recombinant innovation (5) has speed v = 10
and critical mass t0 = 2000. We run the model for T = 10000 periods. Figure 2
shows seven simulation runs without recombinant innovation. The initial advantage of
the dirty technology is too big: the system converges to a complete dominance of this
technology, due to network externalities. Pollution increases and sets to a level dictated
by the dirty regime. A different picture arises if recombinant innovation is strong (figure
3). With e = 0.9 the clean technology initially loses ground, then it recovers when the
recombinant technology takes off. Accordingly, the pollution levels initially grow fast,
and then go down when the critical mass of cumulative investments has been reached.
A stronger recombinant innovation increases the variability of the model. In figure 3
different simulations may differ strongly both in technology share and in pollution levels.
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Figure 2: Seven simulation of the model without recombinant innovation. Left: share of the clean technology.
Right: total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
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Figure 3: Seven simulation of the model with recombinant innovation e = 0.9. Left: share of the clean technology.
Right: total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
In one case, the clean technology only attains x = 0.1 after 10000 time periods, while in
another case it gets to a share larger than x = 0.3.
We study the distribution of a large number of simulations (1000). Figure 4 presents
the histograms of final pollution levels zˆT for three sets of simulations with a different value
of the recombination effectiveness: the stronger recombinant innovation is, the lower the
location of the distribution of pollution levels and the larger its dispersion. Simulations
with longer time horizons (T ≃ 100000) show that technology shares converge to equal
proportions when e is large enough. This suggests the existence of a threshold level of
recombination effectiveness, which is necessary to escape lock-in of the dirty technology.
This threshold depends on the initial condition x0 and on the shape of the learning curve of
η(t) (equation 5), but it is independent on the pollution level, because any feedback from
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Figure 4: Distribution of total pollution level zˆT at time T = 10000 for M = 1000 simulation runs. Left: e = 0.
Centre: e = 0.5. Right: e = 0.9. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
this is missing without environmental policy. If recombinant innovation can unlock the
system from the lock-in of the dirty technology, by no means it can revert the proportions
and make the clean technology dominant: x = 0 or x = 0.5 are the only limit values of
the model.
3 Environmental policy
3.1 Formulation of policy
The model presented so far is symmetric in the two technologies, meaning that no technol-
ogy has an intrinsic advantage. Here we introduce an environmental policy that explicitly
favours the clean technology, breaking the symmetry of the model. One way of modelling
such policy is by introducing a new feedback in the allocation function q(x) of the incre-
ments (8). In the previous model agents were deciding only under the influence of the
positive externality of other agents’ decisions, represented by the proportion xt. We make
the implicit utility u(xi,t) = xi,t more general now by redefining it as u(xi,t) = xi,t−seixi,t,
where ei is the earlier defined intensity of pollution emissions of technology i, and s is
the pollution charge that represents the instrument of environmental policy. According
to this new definition the probability (9) of choosing the clean technology c becomes:
q(x) ≡
exp[β(x− sebx)]
exp[β(x− sebx)] + exp[β(1− x− sea(1− x))]
=
1
1 + exp(a− bx)]
(13)
with a = β(1 − sea) and b = β[2 − s(ea + eb)]. If s = 0 (no policy) we are back in
the previous situation (equation 9). If stringency is too large and sei > 1, the pollution
externality overcomes increasing returns for technology i. We first look at the combined
effect of recombinant innovation and policy on the distribution of the increments α with
respect to the proportion x. Figure 5 shows the plots of the expected value E[α(x)] =
11
[1−p(x)]q(x)+0.5p(x) for six choices of (e, s) in the long run, where η(t) ≃ e. Symmetry
is lost whenever s > 0.
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Figure 5: Plots of the expected value of investment E[α(x)], with and without recombinant innovation.
Left: without policy (s=0). Centre: with s=0.05. Right: with s = 0.1.
3.2 Simulation of the model with environmental policy
In the following we simulate the model for different levels of policy stringency s and
recombination effectiveness e. As before, we assume the dirty technology has emission
intensity ten times larger than the clean technology (ed = 10, ec = 1), and the last one
is much less diffused, with a share x0 = 10%. All other parameters are set with the
same value of the simulations without policy. Let us first consider the case without re-
combinant innovation, evaluating the model for three different levels of policy stringency.
In the case with s = 0.05 (figure 6)) the system converges to the dominance of the
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Figure 6: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0 and s = 0.05. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
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Figure 7: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0 and s = 0.06. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
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Figure 8: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0 and s = 0.07. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
dirty technology, with consequent increase of the pollution intensity. This indicates that
such policy stringency is inadequate to mitigate pollution in the situation considered. A
slightly more stringent policy (s = 0.06, figure 7) may lead to very different outcomes: in
some cases the system remains locked-in into the dirty technology, while in other cases the
clean technology overcomes eventually the dirty one, with consequent large abatement
of the total pollution intensity. Such a high variability is testified also by the values of
the cumulative emissions in the seven simulation (left part of figure 7). With s = 0.07
the system always escapes lock-in, converging to the dominance of the clean technology
(figure 8). These simulations show that an environmental policy can unlock the sys-
tem from the dirty technology. This happens if the negative externality from pollution
weights more in agents decisions than the initial network externalities advantage of the
dirty technology. The case s = 0.06 is one where the two forces are comparable. The final
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outcomes present a high variability depending strongly on early decisions by agents. This
mechanisms explains the path dependency of the technology shares dynamics ((Arthur,
1989)).
Recombinant innovation may or may not work in the same direction as environmental
policy. It helps to abate pollution when the policy is weak (figure 9). In the case of
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Figure 9: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0.9 and s = 0.05. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
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Figure 10: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0.9 and s = 0.06. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
figure 10 the abatement is even larger: recombinant innovation and environmental pol-
icy work together in favour of the clean technology. If we compare this case with the
corresponding case without recombinant innovation (figure 7) we see a trade off in the
action of recombinant innovation: on the one hand it limits the abatement of pollution,
excluding the possibility that the clean technology overcomes the dirty one, on the other
hand it reduces strongly the variability of final outcomes. The negative effect of recom-
binant innovation is more evident with a strong environmental policy (s = 0.07, figure
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Figure 11: Seven simulation of the model with e = 0.9 and s = 0.05. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
11): initially the clean technology outperforms the dirty one, thanks to the environmental
policy, but later it loses ground, due to the takeoff of recombinant innovation.
Now we study the distribution of many simulations of the model with environmental
policy. Figure 12 contains the result for s = 0.05. The three different histograms indicate
that recombinant innovation reduces pollution, with lower dispersion of final outcome
the larger its effectiveness. With a stronger environmental policy we obtain the results in
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Figure 12: Distribution of total pollution level zˆT at time T = 10000 forM = 1000 simulation runs. Environmental
policy has s = 0.05. Left: e = 0. Centre: e = 0.5. Right: e = 0.9. Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10,
ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
figure 13. The variability is lower with respect to a weaker policy. What is more impor-
tant, recombinant innovation limits the effect of a strong environmental policy in terms
of abatement of pollution. Figure 14 considers the effect of a different stringency s of
environmental policy, for a given effectiveness of recombinant innovation. The mean pol-
lution level goes down when the policy becomes more stringent, as expected. Regarding
the standard deviation of final outcomes, the effect of stringency is not univocal. Never-
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theless, also the cumulative pollution emission over the period considered (T = 10000) is
much reduced with a more stringent policy.
Summarizing the results, recombinant innovation helps to escape from the lock-in of
the dirty technology, notably if policy stringency is not too high. When recombinant
innovation is strong enough, the outcome is a 50/50 scenario, with limited abatement of
pollution. This means that recombinant innovation is harmful when the environmental
policy is very stringent. But if the government can not realize a stringent policy, then re-
combinant innovation helps to reduce pollution and also makes the possible final outcome
less uncertain.
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3.3 Cost of environmental policy
As a final extension of the model we include the cost of the environmental policy, and
study how this affects technology diffusion and pollution. The cost of an environmental
policy may be modeled through a factor that lowers the growth rate, meaning that both
investments in clean and dirty technology have a lower return. Formally, we define a cost
factor r ∈ [0, 1] which enters the sequential decision equations (1) in the following way:
nd,t = nd,t−1 + rαt (14)
nc,t = nc,t−1 + r(1− αt)
Consequently, the difference equation of the stochastic process xt for the share of clean
technology (7) becomes
xt+1 = xt +
1
w + t
[
rα(xt)− xt
]
(15)
One way to link the cost factor to the stringency of the environmental policy s is by
defining r ≡ 1
1+s
: the more stringent is the policy, the higher is the cost. Let see how
policy costs affect the distribution of final outcomes of the model. We consider first
a policy with stringency s = 0.05 (figure 15). If we compare the distributions of final
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Figure 15: Distribution of total pollution level zˆT at time T = 10000 with environmental policy costs, for
M = 1000 simulation runs. Environmental policy has s = 0.05. Left: e = 0. Centre: e = 0.5. Right: e = 0.9.
Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
pollution levels with the distributions obtained without policy costs (figure 12), the mean
level is higher, especially when recombinant innovation is present. The reason is that
policy costs turn out to affect more strongly the investments in the clean technology. A
stronger policy (s = 0.06, figure 16) increases the variability of final outcomes, making the
distribution very skewed. This is more evident the less effective recombinant innovation
is. With s = 0.07 (figure 17) the skewness of emissions distribution is less pronounced
than with s = 0.06. With respect to the model without policy costs, this time final
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emission levels are more dispersed, but the mean level is not much higher. Actually it is
even lower when recombinant innovation is strong (e = 0.9). This means that policy costs
affect less the location of the distribution when the policy is more stringent. These results
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Figure 17: Distribution of total pollution level zˆT at time T = 10000 with environmental policy costs, for
M = 1000 simulation runs. Environmental policy has s = 0.07. Left: e = 0. Centre: e = 0.5. Right: e = 0.9.
Parameters are x0 = 0.1, w = 100, ed = 10, ec = 1, β = 8, v = 10 and t0 = 2000.
show that policy costs do not change the main message: recombinant innovation helps
to abate pollution emissions if environmental policy is not too strong. But the effects of
recombinant innovation are weakened by policy costs: when policy is mild, recombinant
innovation does not help much, when it is strong, it does not hurt much. If policy costs
are included then, the results indicate that recombinant hybrid technologies are less but
still effective in contributing to the abatement of pollution.
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4 Conclusions
We have studied the decision problem of investments in a dirty and a clean technology,
when these are subject to increasing returns to investments and can recombine to produce
a hybrid technology. Agents can choose one or the other technology, or create a diversified
portfolio. We have constructed a model that extends the well-known Arthur (1989)
model of competing technologies in two ways: adding (differential) pollution intensities
of competing technologies, and introducing the expectation of a hybrid technology due
to recombining the two competing technologies.
The diversification incentive of a hybrid technology is opposed to the specialization
tendency due to the positive feedback of increasing returns that characterizes Arthur’s
model. If the effectiveness of recombinant innovation is large enough, lock-in of any tech-
nology is prevented. If the effectiveness is too low, the dirty technology takes advantage
of its initial wider diffusion and ends up dominating the market. With a critical mass
effect in the recombinant innovation learning curve we obtain a reversal of the initial
path towards lock-in. The two technologies then converge to equal proportions after the
reversal. Recombinant innovation can thus provoke a regime shift in the technological
path and unlock the economy from an undesirable dominant dirty technology, to the
advantage of the clean technology.
In a second stage we introduced environmental policy in the model in the form of a
pollution charge, which causes a negative feedback from pollution to investment choices.
The system becomes asymmetric given that different emission intensities enter the im-
plicit utility function of agents. Consequently there are three forces interacting in the
model, namely increasing returns, recombinant innovation and environmental policy. We
find that recombinant innovation helps substantially to escape from lock-in of the dirty
technology, notably if the stringency of the environmental policy is low. On the other
hand, if environmental policy is stringent, recombinant innovation limits the abatement
of pollution (although it reduces the uncertainty of the outcome), as the system will not
entirely move away from the dirty technology. This limitation would lose relevance if the
recombinant hybrid alternative emerges and enters the technology competition (which
falls outside our model frame).
If we also consider the costs of the environmental policy, the role of recombinant
innovation becomes less important. Nevertheless it remains effective in abating pollution.
It fosters investment in the clean technology through the intermediate advantage of a
diversified technological portfolio enhanced by a hybrid technology. Moreover, cumulative
pollution grows less fast.
To conclude, recombinant innovation resulting from highly diversified investments in
19
dirty and clean technologies can be seen as a second best strategy to realize a substitution
of a dirty to a clean technology. It can contribute to a smooth transition from a fossil
fuel based economy to one relying on renewable resources.
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